Nash Social Distancing Games with Equity Constraints: How Inequality
  Aversion Affects the Spread of Epidemics by Kordonis, Ioannis et al.
1Nash Social Distancing Games with Equity
Constraints: How Inequality Aversion Affects
the Spread of Epidemics
Ioannis Kordonis, Athanasios-Rafail Lagos, George P. Papavassilopoulos
Abstract
In this paper, we present a game-theoretic model describing the voluntary social distancing during
the spread of an epidemic. The payoffs of the agents depend on the social distancing they practice and
on the probability of getting infected. We consider two types of agents, the vulnerable agents who have a
small cost if they get infected and the non-vulnerable agents who have a higher cost. For the modeling of
the epidemic outbreak, a variant of the SIR model is considered, involving populations of susceptible,
infected, and recovered persons of vulnerable and non-vulnerable types. The Nash equilibria of this
social distancing game are studied. We then analyze the case where the players, desiring to achieve a
low social inequality, pose a bound on the variance of the payoffs. In this case, we introduce a notion
of Generalized Nash Equilibrium (GNE), for games with a continuum of players and characterize the
GNE. We then present some numerical results. It turns out that inequality constraints result in a slower
spread of the epidemic and an improved cost for the vulnerable players. Furthermore, it is possible that
inequality constraints are beneficial for non-vulnerable players as well.
I. INTRODUCTION
Epidemics harass humanity for centuries, and people investigate several strategies to contain
them. The development of medicines and vaccines and the evolution of healthcare systems with
specialized personnel and equipped hospitals have significantly affected the spread of many
epidemics and have even eliminated some contagious diseases. However, during the current
Covid-19 pandemic, due to the lack of appropriate medicines and vaccines and the inadequacy
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2of many healthcare systems, social distancing is the most effective strategy to reduce the disease
spread.
In order to respond efficiently to an epidemic, the strategies that people would adopt should
be designed carefully, based on elaborate epidemiological models. In the last century, epidemiol-
ogists have made significant progress in the mathematical modeling of the spread of epidemics.
From the seminal works of W.O.Kermack & A.G.McKendrick [1] and R.Ross [2] a prevalent
approach in the mathematical modeling of epidemics are the compartmental models. These
models consider that each agent belongs in some compartment according to her health state (e.g.,
Susceptible-Infected-Recovered) and study the evolution of each compartment’s population. The
literature on these models is extensive, so for a summary we refer to Chapter 2 of [3]. Nowadays,
there exist also other elegant approaches to the epidemic modeling, such as the ones that take into
consideration the heterogeneous networked structure of human interconnections [4]. Despite that
fact, the compartmental models remain a well studied and fruitful approach, widely used in real-
life applications. Let us note that the majority of models used in the forecast of hospitalization
and the number of COVID-19 deaths in the United States use some compartmental model1.
The development of epidemiological models is a rather useful tool in the designing of pro-
tective measures against the spread of an epidemic, but since these measures should be adopted
by agents who are considered to act rationally, game theory is an appropriate complementary
mathematical tool to be used in this field. Indeed, many game theoretic models have been
developed to study the phenomena of voluntary vaccination [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11],
[12] and of behavioral changes of the agents [13], [14], [15], [16], [17], [18], [19], [20], [21],
[22], [23], [24], such as social distancing, usage of face masks and practice of better hygiene.
Recently, with the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, there is a renewed interest on the
modeling of individual behaviors. For example, [25] provides a dynamic game analysis of social
distancing, [26], [27], [28] use evolutionary game theory to study social distancing behaviors
and [29] analyze the effects of the structure of the network of social interactions, the quality of
information, and the capacity of the health-care system on the spread of epidemics.
The game theoretic models, specifically the ones which consider competitive games (all of our
references belong in this category), are based on the assumption that the rational behavior for
1See https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-updates/hospitalizations-forecasts.html and
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/covid-data/forecasting-us.html
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3an agent is to maximize selfishly her own payoff ignoring for the social impacts (externalities)
of this choice. This can lead to ‘free-riding’ phenomena in vaccination games [8], [11] or in
disobedience of social distancing rules in social distancing games, which can both result in a
higher prevalence of the spread of the epidemic [8], [30] and to harmful consequences for the
vulnerable members of the society. The phenomenon that the Nash equilibrium strategies result
to a social welfare less than the optimal one is well known in game theory community as the
Tragedy of the Commons, [31]. Moreover, even in the cases considering that the agents prefer
the strategies which maximize a social welfare function, either utilitarian (the average payoff)
or egalitarian (the minimum payoff) [32], there still exist inequalities among their payoffs.
In this work, it is attempted a novel approach to model the possible desire of the agents to
respect their fellow agents and keep the inequality among their payoffs below a certain threshold.
Especially in the case that an agent has vulnerable relatives, it is rather natural for her to alter
her behavior during an epidemic outbreak in order to protect them. Let us note that there is a
lot empirical evidence that people are motivated by fairness considerations (e.g. [33], [34]), and
that often people are willing to sacrifice some of their own payoff to achieve a more equitable
outcome. On a first approach, we consider that the players share a common constraint bounding
inequality (variance of their costs).
We consider a compartmental model (SIR) for the spread of an epidemic and a social distancing
game among the agents, similarly to [18], [20], [21]. The payoffs of the agents consist of two
terms: a cost for the social distancing and a cost proportional to the probability of getting
infected. There are two types of agents, the vulnerable agents who have a small cost if they get
infected and non-vulnerable agents who have a higher cost. The size of the society is considered
to be large, so the game has a continuum of players (it is a non-atomic game). In this game the
agents determine the intensity of their social contacts so as to optimize their personal payoff and
simultaneously respect a constraint concerning the variance of the payoffs of all the agents. Due
to this constraint, the game is, in fact, a generalized game with a non-convex constraint. The
majority of the bibliography on generalized games (e.g. [35], [36]) do not analyze generalized
games with non-convex constraints. Furthermore, there are a few references on generalized non-
atomic games [37],[38],[39]. However, in these papers, the convexity of the constraint set is
build into the definition of the GNE. Thus, in this work we define and characterize GNE for
constrained non-atomic games.
It turns out that, in the absence of a variance constraint, players either choose complete isolation
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4or complete sociability (see also Remark 3). It is also interesting that we may have many Nash
equilibria inducing different costs for the players. Thus, even in the absence of social distancing
regulations, it is beneficial for the players to coordinate and choose the ‘best’ equilibrium. In
the variance constrained case, there are GNE with intermediate values of sociability. We find
numerically that inequality constraints are always beneficial for the vulnerable players, and that
sometimes inequality constraints are beneficial for the group of the non-vulnerable agents, as
well.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the compartmental model for the
epidemic outbreak and for the social distancing game between the agents is introduced. In Section
III, we analyze the game and characterize its Nash equilibria. In Section IV, we introduce the
constraint that concerns the variance of the payoffs and derive an appropriate definition of Nash
equilibrium variance constrained games. In section V, we present at first a methodology for the
computation of the Nash equilibrium strategies of section III and then present some numerical
examples of them. Moreover, in the same section, we compute numerically an equilibrium for
the variance constrained game, which satisfies the definition we introduce in section IV. In the
Appendix we collocate the proofs of several propositions of the paper.
II. MATHEMATICAL MODEL
This section presents a variation of a popular epidemics model which assumes a continuum
of agents. The state of each agent could be Susceptible (S), Infected (I), or Recovered (R). This
state evolves according to Markov process of Figure 1. As the Markov process indicates, we
assume that an individual recovered from the infection is immune i.e., she could not be infected
again.
S I R
D
αj-α'j
α'j
Fig. 1. The Markov process describing the evolution of the state of each individual.
We distinguish between two types of agents: non-vulnerable and vulnerable. We use the index
j = 1 for non-vulnerable agents and j = 2 for vulnerable. The difference of the two types of
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5agents is the probability to survive an infection. An infected agent recovers with a probability
rate α′j and dies with a probability rate αj − α′j .
We analyze the behavior of the agents for a time interval [0, T ]. Denote by ui ∈ [um, uM ]
the action of player i, indicating the fraction of time this person spends in public places. The
minimum value of the actions um describes the minimum contact a person needs for surviving
and uM a restriction placed by the government. In the absence of a restriction we consider
uM = 1.
Denote by µ1 a (Borel) measure on [um, uM ] describing the distribution of the actions of the
players in category 1 i.e., for A ⊂ [um, uM ], the value of µ1(A) denotes the mass of the players
using an action u ∈ A. Similarly, denote by µ2 the distribution of actions of the players of type
2. The total mass of players of types 1 and 2 is n1, and n2 respectively i.e., µ1([um, uM ]) = n1
and µ2([um, uM ]) = n2. We first describe the evolution of the epidemic for general distributions
µ1, µ2.
Denote by S1u(t) the probability a non-vulnerable player who plays u ∈ [um, uM ] be suscep-
tible at time t, and by I1u(t) the probability to be infected. Similarly define S2u(t), I2u(t). The
rate at which this person gets infected is given by: ruIf , where r is a positive constant and
If denotes the density of infected people in ‘public places’. Each player contributes to If (t)
proportionally to her probability of being infected at time t. The dynamics are given by:
S˙1u = −ruS1uIf (t)
S˙2u = −ruS2uIf (t)
I˙1u = ruS1uI
f (t)− α1I1u
I˙2u = ruS2uI
f (t)− α2I2u
z˙ = If (t)
, (1)
where:
If (t) =
∫
[um,uM ]
I1u′(t)u
′ · µ1(du′) +
∫
[um,uM ]
I2u′(t)u
′ · µ2(du′). (2)
The initial conditions are
S1u(0) = S2u(0) = (1− I0), I1u(0) = I2u(0) = I0, (3)
where I0 is the percentage of infected persons at time 0. Here, we assume that at the beginning
of the epidemic, all the agents are infected with a small probability I0.
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6Before showing the existence of a solution for the initial value problem (1)–(3), we introduce
the following function spaces:
X = C([um, uM ],R4)× R,
where C([um, uM ],R4) is the space of continuous functions defined on [um, uM ] and values on
R4. The space X equipped with the norm:
‖x‖ = max{|x1u|, |x2u|, |x3u|, |x4u|, |x5| : u ∈ [um, uM ]},
is a Banach space. We also consider the Banach space Y of signed measures on [um, uM ] with
the total variation norm.
Proposition 1: The initial value problem (1)–(3) has a unique solution. Furthermore, this
solution in continuous on u.
Proof: See Appendix A. 
The cost of agent i consists of two terms. The first term is proportional to the probability
of getting infected and the vulnerability of the player. The second term, represents the benefits
earned from social interactions that the agent loses in the case she applies social distancing. The
cost is given by:
Ji = GjPi − [sj1uiu¯1 + sj2uiu¯2], (4)
where Gj = (αj − α′j)/αj stands for the probability that a player i of type j does not survive
an infection, Pi the probability that she gets infected within the time interval [0, T ], and u¯1, u¯2
the mean actions of the players of types j = 1 and j = 2 respectively. Note that G2 > G1.
Remark 1: The second term in (4) captures the utility player i receives from her contact with
people of types j = 1 and j = 2 respectively. To keep things simple, we assume that the number
of people in these types is approximately constant with time. This approximation is accurate in
epidemics with a low mortality rate and duration small compared to the average human life.
Remark 2: We assume that the actions ui of all the players are constant during the time
interval [0, T ]. In a more general model they could be functions of the state variables or time,
but there are some arguments in favor of this choice. First, there may be a high uncertainty
for the values of the state variables. Second, ui’s reflect some everyday routine choices of the
people and these choices may be difficult to adapt constantly.
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7Let us then compute the probability of getting infected Pi. The probability Sijui(t) that an
agent i of either type (j = 1 or j = 2) is not infected up to time t evolves according to:
S˙ijui = −rSijuiuiIf .
Thus, we have:
Pi = 1− Sijui(T ) = I0 + (1− I0)
[
1− exp
(
−rui
∫ T
0
If (t)dt
)]
.
Here, we assume that at the beginning of the epidemic, all the agents are infected with a small
probability I0. Denoting by F (µ1, µ2) = r
∫ T
0
If (t)dt the cost is written as:
Jj(ui, µ1, µ2) = Gj [I0 + (1− I0) [1− exp (−uiF (µ1, µ2))]]− sj1uiu¯1 − sj2uiu¯2.
Since we assume a very large population of players, each one of them is not able to affect the
distributions µ1, µ2. It is interesting to observe that the individual cost Ji is concave in ui. To
see this take the second derivative of Ji with respect to ui:
∂2Ji
∂u2i
= −Gj(1− I0) exp
(
−rui
∫ T
0
If (t)dt
)(
−
∫ T
0
If (t)dt
)2
< 0.
Therefore, the possible actions minimizing the individual cost are ui = um and ui = uM . Thus,
to compute the Nash equilibria, we focus on distributions assigning the entire mass on {um, uM}.
Remark 3: The fact that the cost function Ji is concave in ui simplifies the analysis a lot,
implying that players either choose complete isolation or complete sociability. It further allows
us to describe dynamics using a finite-dimensional model. Let us note that the first term of Ji,
describing the expected cost of an infection, is concave on the player’s action, and the second
term i.e., −sj1uiu¯1 − sj2uiu¯2, is linear in ui. In a more general model with a non-linear second
term, the cost function would not necessarily be concave.
III. NASH EQUILIBRIUM
To analyze the Nash equilibrium we focus on distributions having all the mass on {um, uM}.
The dynamics is given by:
S˙1um = −rumIfS1um , S˙1uM = −ruMIfS1uM ,
S˙2um = −rumIfS2um , S˙2uM = −ruMIfS2uM ,
I˙1um = rumI
fS1um − α1I1um , I˙1uM = ruMIfS1uM − α1I1uM ,
I˙2um = rumI
fS2um − α2I2um , I˙2uM = ruMIfS2uM − α2I2uM ,
z˙ = If ,
(5)
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8where the total mass of ‘free infected people’ If is given by:
If (t) = n1(umI1um(t) + uMI1uM (t)) + n2(umI2um(t) + uMI2uM (t)).
Denoting by u˜j the percentage of players of type j using uM , the initial conditions are given
by:
S1um(0) = (1− u˜1)(1− I0), S1uM (0) = u˜1(1− I0), S2um(0) = (1− u˜2)(1− I0),
S2uM (0) = u˜2(1− I0), I1um(0) = (1− u˜1)I0, I1uM (0) = u˜1I0,
I2um(0) = (1− u˜2)I0, I2uM (0) = u˜2I0, z(0) = 0
(6)
Denote by φzu˜1,u˜2(t) the z-part of the solution of the differential equation (5) with initial
condition (6). Then it holds:
F (µ1, µ2) = F (u˜1, u˜2) = rφ
z
u˜1,u˜2
(T ).
Remark 4: The situation is simplified for um = 0. In this case, we have a set of five ODEs
instead of nine.
Remark 5: We view the equilibria where some players of type j play um and some uM
as equilibria in symmetric mixed strategies. Particularly, each player of type j plays uM with
probability u˜j .
Proposition 2: Consider a set of strategies characterized by u˜1, u˜2, where a fraction 1− u˜j of
the players of type j use u = um and a fraction u˜j of the players of type j use u = uM . This set
of strategies is a Nash equilibrium if and only if for each j = 1, 2 one of the following holds:
(i) 0 < u˜j < 1 and:
Gj(1− I0)(e−umF (u˜1,u˜2) − e−uMF (u˜1,u˜2)) = (uM − um)(sj1u¯1 + sj2u¯2),
where u¯j = um + (uM − um)u˜j.
(ii) u˜j = 0 and:
Gj(1− I0)(e−umF (u˜1,u˜2) − e−uMF (u˜1,u˜2)) ≥ (uM − um)(sj1u¯1 + sj2u¯2).
(iii) u˜j = 1 and:
Gj(1− I0)(e−umF (u˜1,u˜2) − e−uMF (u˜1,u˜2)) ≤ (uM − um)(sj1u¯1 + sj2u¯2).
Proof : The proof is immediate, observing that (i) corresponds to the case where the players of
type j are indifferent between um and uM and (ii), (iii) correspond to preference of um over uM
and uM over um respectively. 
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9The existence of a Nash equilibrium is a consequence of Theorem 1 of [40].
Corollary 1: Assume that s11 = s21 and s12 = s22. Then, the possible Nash equilibria (u˜1, u˜2)
are in of one of the following forms (0, 0), (u˜1, 0), (1, 0), (1, u˜2), (1, 1).
Proof : Let (u˜1, u˜2) be a Nash equilibrium. Then, if u˜1 < 1 it holds:
G1(1− I0)(e−umF (u˜1,u˜2) − e−uMF (u˜1,u˜2)) ≥ (uM − um)(s11u¯1 + s12u¯2).
Since, s11 = s21, s12 = s22 and G2 > G1 we have:
G2(1− I0)(e−umF (u˜1,u˜2) − e−uMF (u˜1,u˜2)) > (uM − um)(s21u¯1 + s22u¯2).
But, since (u˜1, u˜2) is a Nash equilibrium Proposition (2) implies that u˜2 = 0 
Corollary 2: If um = 0, there is always a Nash equilibrium (u˜1, u˜2) = (0, 0).
IV. THE VARIANCE CONSTRAINED GAME
This section analyzes a game situation, where the players pose a shared bound on the variance
of their costs. To do so, we first introduce a notion of equilibrium with a shared constraint, for
non-atomic games, and then characterize it in terms of small variations. We assume that the
strategies of the players are symmetric(that is all the players of the same type use the same
strategy), allowing for randomization. Consider a pair of distributions (µ1, µ2) for the actions of
the players. Then, the players of type j randomize according to µ¯j(·) = µj(·)/nj .
The variance of the costs is given by:
V (µ1, µ2) =
∫
(J1(u
′, µ1, µ2)− J¯)2µ1(du′) +
∫
(J2(u
′, µ1, µ2)− J¯)2µ2(du′)
n1 + n2
,
=
n1
∫
(J1(u
′, µ1, µ2)− J¯)2µ¯1(du′) + n2
∫
(J2(u
′, µ1, µ2)− J¯)2µ¯2(du′)
n1 + n2
,
(7)
where J¯ = (n1J¯1 + n2J¯2)/(n1 + n2), and:
J¯j =
1
nj
∫
Jj(u
′, µ1, µ2)µj(du′) =
∫
Jj(u
′, µ1, µ2)µ¯j(du′).
We then describe a notion of equilibrium for the generalized game with variance constraints.
Ideally, to have an equilibrium, the actions of each player should minimize the cost subject to
the variance constraint. The difficult point here is that, since we have a continuum of players,
the variance does not depend on the actions of individual players. To define a meaningful notion
of equilibrium, instead of analyzing the effect of a deviation of a single player, we consider the
deviation of a small fraction of players of type j and see how a variation from the nominal
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mixed strategy µ¯j affects the cost of this small group of players and the total variance. Then,
we take the limit as the total mass of the group of players tends to zero.
Denote by j the type of players containing the deviating group and by −j the other type of
players. Assume that the total mass of deviating players is ε and that the deviating players use
a mixed strategy µ¯′j (note that it holds µ¯
′
j([um, uM ]) = 1). Then, the distribution of the actions
of the players of type j is given by:
µj + ε(µ¯
′
j − µ¯j) = µj + εδµj.
The mean cost of the deviating players after the deviation is:
J¯devj =
∫
Jj(u
′, µj + ε(µ¯′j − µ¯j), µ−j)µj ′(du′),
while before the deviation is J¯j .
Lemma 1: For all µ−j it holds:
(i) The limit of the variation J¯devj − J¯j , as ε→∞, is a linear function of δµj . Particularly, it
is written as:
lim
ε→0
(J¯devj − J¯j) =Kjµ1,µ2δµj =
∫
Jj(u
′, µj, µ−j)δµj(du′), (8)
where Kjµ1,µ2 ∈ Y ? and Y ? is the space of bounded linear functionals on Y .
(ii) The directional derivative of the variance V (µj, µ−j) in the direction δµj is expressed as:
lim
ε→0
V (µj + εδµj, µ−j)− V (µj, µ−j)
ε
=Ljµ1,µ2δµj,
where Ljµ1,µ2 ∈ Y ?. Furthermore, Ljµ1,µ2 can be written as:
Ljµ1,µ2δµj =
∫
f varj,V,µ1,µ2(u
′)δµj(du′),
with f varj,V,µ1,µ2(u
′) continuous.
Proof: See Appendix B. 
Definition 1 (Generalized Nash Equilibrium): A distribution of actions described by (µ1, µ2)
is a Generalized Nash Equilibrium (GNE) with variance constraint V ≤ C if either:
(i) V (µ1, µ2) < C and for j = 1, 2 and for any probability measure µ¯′j , it holds:
Kjµ1,µ2δµj ≥ 0,
where δµj = µ¯′j − µ¯j , or
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(ii) V (µ1, µ2) = C and for j = 1, 2 and for any probability measure µ¯′j , it holds:
Kjµ1,µ2δµj < 0 =⇒ Ljµ1,µ2δµj > 0,
where δµj = µ¯′j − µ¯j .
Remark 6: In the first case of the definition, any small group of players is not sufficient to
increase the variance above C. Thus, if µ1, µ2 is an equilibrium, there is no profitable deviation,
and the definition coincides with the equilibrium of Section III. In the second case, µ1, µ2 is
an equilibrium, if any profitable deviation for a small group of players, increases the variance
above C.
Remark 7: In [37], [38], [39] notions of GNE for games with a continuum of players are
introduced. However, these definitions assume a convex constraint set. Let us note that Definition
1 is neither a generalization nor a special case of the corresponding definitions in [37], [38],
[39].
We then introduce a refinement of GNE, called non-singular GNE. It turns out that non-singular
GNE are easier to compute.
Definition 2 (non-singular GNE): A pair (µ1, µ2) is variance stationary if either:
(i) for all δµ1 = µ¯′1 − µ¯1, with µ¯′1 probability measure, it holds:
L1µ1,µ2δµ1 ≥ 0,
or
(ii) for all δµ2 = µ¯′2 − µ¯2, with µ¯′2 probability measure, it holds:
L2µ1,µ2δµ2 ≥ 0.
We call a GNE (µ1, µ2) non-singular if it is not variance stationary.
Lemma 2: Assume that (µ1, µ2) is not variance stationary. Then, (µ1, µ2) is a Generalized
Nash equilibrium with variance constraint V ≤ C if and only if either it satisfies (i) of Definition
1 or V (µ1, µ2) = C and for j = 1, 2 and for any probability measure µ¯′j , it holds:
Kjµ1,µ2δµj < 0 =⇒ Ljµ1,µ2δµj ≥ 0, (9)
where δµj = µ¯′j − µ¯j .
Proof: The direct part is immediate. Assume that the converse is not true, that is, there is a
probability measure µ¯′j such that:
Kjµ1,µ2(µ¯
′
j − µ¯j) < 0, Ljµ1,µ2(µ¯′j − µ¯j) = 0.
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Then, since (µ1, µ2) is not variance stationary, there is a probability measure µ¯′′j such that
Ljµ1,µ2(µ¯
′′
j − µ¯j) < 0. Hence, there is a θ ∈ (0, 1) such that:
Kjµ1,µ2(θµ¯
′
j + (1− θ)µ¯′′j − µ¯j) < 0, Ljµ1,µ2(θµ¯′j + (1− θ)µ¯′′j − µ¯j) < 0.
But this contradicts (9). 
Assume that VA(µ1, µ2) = C and (µ1, µ2) is not variance stationary. Then, (µ1, µ2) is an
equilibrium if and only if there is no δµj = µ¯′j − µ¯j such that:
Kjµ1,µ2δµj < 0 and L
j
µ1,µ2
δµj < 0. (10)
Proposition 3: If there is a probability measure µ¯′j such that (10) holds true, then there is
another probability measure µ¯′′j supported on at most two points which also satisfies (10) with
δµ = µ¯′′ − µ¯j .
Proof: See Appendix C 
Remark 8: Given a non variance stationary pair (µ1, µ2), in order to check if it is a GNE, we
need only to check deviations supported in pairs of points.
Let us introduce the following quantities:
gKj,µ1,µ2(u) =K
j
µ1,µ2
(du − µ¯j), gLj,µ1,µ2(u) =Ljµ1,µ2(du − µ¯j),
where du is a Dirac measure supported on u. Using these quantities we have the following
necessary (Corollary 3), and necessary and sufficient conditions (Corollary 4).
Corollary 3: If (µ1, µ2) is a GNE then for all u ∈ [um, uM ], j = 1, 2 if gKj,µ1,µ2(u) < 0 then
gLj,µ1,µ2(u) ≥ 0.
Corollary 4: A non variance stationary point (µ1, µ2) is a GNE if and only if for all u′, u′′ ∈
[um, uM ], ρ ∈ [0, 1], j = 1, 2 if ρgKj,µ1,µ2(u′) + (1 − ρ)gKj,µ1,µ2(u′′) < 0 then ρgLj,µ1,µ2(u′) + (1 −
ρ)gLj,µ1,µ2(u
′′) ≥ 0.
V. COMPUTATIONAL STUDY
A. Computing Unconstrained Nash Equilibria
The computation of the value of F (u¯1, u¯2) corresponds to the numerical integration of (5).
The search for pure Nash equilibria needs just the computation of F (0, 1), F (1, 0), and F (1, 1)
and checking the corresponding inequalities.
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Let us then describe the procedure to find equilibria in the form of the (u˜1, 0) or (u˜1, 1). We
have first to find the solutions of:
Hu˜2(u˜1) = G1(1−I0)(e−umF (u˜1,u˜2)−e−uMF (u˜1,u˜2))−(uM−um)(sj1(um+(uM−um)u˜1)+sj2u¯2) = 0,
with respect to u˜1, for a fixed value of u˜2 = 0, 1. To do so we use line search (an alternative,
would be to use a multi-start Newton algorithm). Having found a solution of Hu˜2(u˜1) = 0 for
u˜2 = 0 or u˜2 = 1 we need also to check the corresponding inequality. The computation of
possible equilibria in the form (0, u˜2) or (1, u˜2)is similar.
Let us compute any possible Nash equilibrium where both types use mixed strategies (internal
Nash equilibria). Then we should have:
G1(1− I0)(e−umF (u˜1,u˜2) − e−uMF (u˜1,u˜2)) = (uM − um)(s11u¯1 + s12u¯2)
G2(1− I0)(e−umF (u˜1,u˜2) − e−uMF (u˜1,u˜2)) = (uM − um)(s21u¯1 + s22u¯2)
(11)
Any solution of this equation should belong to the line:
G2(s11u¯1 + s12u¯2) = G1(s21u¯1 + s22u¯2)
or equivalently:
(G2s11 −G1s21)u˜1 + (G2s12 −G1s22)u˜2 = G1(s21 + s22)−G2(s11 + s12)
uM − um um. (12)
Therefore, to find any internal Nash equilibria, we examine using line search if there are
solution of (11) on the line (12). We then present some examples with concrete values for the
parameters.
Example 1: The parameters are: um = 0.1, uM = 0.9, T = 50, r = 2, I0 = 0.01, n1 = 2 ,
n2 = 0.5, α1 = α2 = 1. We start with an example where s11 = s21 = 2 and s12 = s22 = 0.5.
The following table presents the Nash equilibria when G2/G1 = 5 for various values of G1.
September 2, 2020 DRAFT
14
G1 G2 (u˜
1
1, u˜
1
2) (J
1
1 , J
1
2 ) (u˜
2
1, u˜
2
2) (J
2
1 , J
2
2 ) (u˜
3
1, u˜
3
2) (J
3
1 , J
3
2 )
0.2 1 (1,1) (−1.83,−1.04) - -
0.5 2.5 (1,0) (−1.19, 0.57) (1,1) (−1.53, 0.43) (1,0.395) (−1.32, 0.61)
0.56 2.8 (1,0) (−1.13, 0.66) (1,1) (−1.48, 0.72) (1,0.8412) (−1.42, 0.77)
0.6 3 (1,0) (−1.09, 0.72) - -
1.6 8 (1,0) (−0.13, 2.22) (0.44,0) (0.06, 0.70) (0.65,0) (0.18, 1.42)
2.24 11.2 (1,0) (0.48, 3.18) (0.35,0) (0.05, 0.56) (0.9932,0) (0.49, 3.18)
2.26 11.3 (0.3535,0) (0.05, 0.57) - -
40 200 (0.0512,0) (0.4, 2.15) - -
50 250 (0,0) (0.5, 2.61) - -
We observe that when G1, G2 are small, the equilibrium strategies are u˜1 = u˜2 = 1. Then, as
G1, G2 become larger, there are three equilibria: (0, 0), (1, 1) and a mixed one (1, u˜2). This region
is illustrated in the left part of Figure 2. After G1 = 0.59, there is a single equilibrium (1, 0).
When G1 becomes approximately 1.5, two mixed equilibria emerge. This region is illustrated in
the right part of Figure 2. The three equilibria coexist, until the larger mixed equilibrium meets
with the pure equilibrium and disappears. Then, for 2.25 < G1 < 48, there is a single Nash
equilibrium in the form (u˜1, 0). For G1 > 48 there is a single pure Nash equilibrium: (0, 0).
0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6
G1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
u 2
Equilibria
1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 2.2 2.4 2.6
G1
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
u 1
Equilibria
Fig. 2. The equilibria in the region G1 ∈ [0.2, 0.3] have the form (1, u˜2). The left part of the figure presents the value of u˜2
for various values of G1. The equilibria in the region G1 ∈ [1.2, 2.6] have the form (u˜1, 0). The right part of the figure presents
the value of u˜1 for various values of G1. Recall that in this example G2 = 5G1.
Example 2: In this example, there is a strong homophily i.e., the players of each category
derive more utility from interacting with players of the same group. The parameters are the same,
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except for the sociability parameters: s11 = s22 = 2 and s12 = s21 = 0.5 and the vulnerability
parameters G1 = 2, G2 = 2.8. There are seven Nash equilibria:
N.E. 1 N.E. 2 N.E. 3 N.E. 4 N.E. 5 N.E. 6 N.E. 7
u˜1 1 1 0.3714 0.8853 0.1214 1 0.2408
u˜2 0 1 0 0 1 0.9502 0.5223
J1 0.2481 -0.0622 0.0512 0.3712 0.0512 -0.0490 0.0728
J2 0.7765 0.7230 0.1515 0.6934 -0.5143 0.7788 0.1020
Prevalence 0.8254 0.9815 0.1642 0.7401 0.1642 0.9745 0.164
Prevalence describes the percentage of the population that has been infected before the end of
the time interval [0, T ]. Note that from the seven equilibria, only two (Nash equilibria 2 and 5)
are not Pareto dominated. This shows that, even in the absence of regulations, there is a need
for coordination.
B. Computing Constrained Equilibria
We then search for generalized Nash equilibria with variance constraints. Let us first note that
if the pair (µ1, µ2) satisfies Definition 1.(i) then it also is an unconstrained Nash equilibrium.
Thus, it is sufficient to check if the Nash equilibria computed in the previous section satisfy the
constraint V (µ1, µ2) ≤ C.
We then compute GNE, satisfying Definition 1.(ii), in the case where the policies (µ1, µ2) are
of the form µ1 = n1du1 , µ2 = n2du2 , where du is a Dirac measure concentrated on u. We use
a grid to find the pairs (u1, u2) such that the equality V (µ1, µ2) = c holds approximately. These
points are candidates for GNE. For each of these points in the grid, we compute the functions
gKj,µ1,µ2(u) and g
L
j,µ1,µ2
(u) for j = 1, 2 and a grid of points u. The details of the computation of
gKj,µ1,µ2(u) and g
L
j,µ1,µ2
(u) are given in Appendix D. We then use Corollary 4 to find to check
weather each of these points is a GNE.
Example 3: In this example the parameters are as in Example 1, except for the vulnerability
parameters G1 = 1.6 and G2 = 16. In this case there are three unconstrained Nash equilibria
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N.E. 1 N.E. 2 N.E. 3
u˜1 1 0.4379 0.6542
u˜2 0 0 0
J1 -0.1345 0.0639 0.1790
J2 4.6236 1.4978 2.9655
Prevalence 0.8254 0.2651 0.5308
-0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0 0.1 0.2
J1
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
J 2
N.E. Cost
GNE Costs
Fig. 3. The cost of the Nash equilibria and the GNE, for vulnerable and non-vulnerable players.
Under the constraint V ≤ 0.1 there is a small interval of GNE, consisting of pure strategies.
One of them is (µ¯1, µ¯2) = (d0.44,d0.29). Figure 3 shows that the cost for both groups of players
is smaller under the inequality constraint. In this case, the prevalence of the epidemic is 0.0574.
The GNE for various values of c are illustrated in Figure 4.
Figure 5 shows how costs of the non-vulnerable and vulnerable players vary as a function of
c. We observe that, as the value of the constraint c becomes smaller the cost of both groups of
players decreases. However, for values of c below 0.1, the reduction of the variance constraint
constant c, results in an increase of the cost the non-vulnerable players. Figure 6 illustrates the
prevalence of the epidemics as a function of c. We observe that, as the constraint becomes more
restrictive i.e., c decreases the prevalence of the epidemic decreases as well.
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0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
u1
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
u 2
V=0.3
GNE V=0.3
V=0.15
GNE V=0.15
V=0.05
GNE V=0.05
V=0.02
GNE V=0.02
V=0.01
GNE V=0.01
Fig. 4. The contour line V = c, for various values of c and the corresponding GNE. There is a small distance between the
GNE and the corresponding contour lines due to the use of a grid.
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3
c
-0.35
-0.3
-0.25
-0.2
J 1
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3
c
0
0.5
1
J 2
Fig. 5. The cost of the Nash equilibria and the GNE, for vulnerable and non-vulnerable players, for various values of c. Since,
for the various values of c, there is an interval of equilibria, these equilibria induce different costs for the players of each
category. The dashed lines correspond to the minimum and maximum costs.
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Fig. 6. The prevalence of the epidemic. The dependence of the number of infected agents and the number of the vulnerable
infected agents as a function of the parameter c.
VI. CONCLUSION
We analyzed social distancing games, involving vulnerable and non-vulnerable populations of
players, characterized the Nash equilibria and investigated how inequality constraints influence
the epidemic spread and the costs of the players. It turns out that, in the absence of constraints,
each player uses either maximum or minimum socialization. We also defined a Generalized
Nash equilibrium concept for non-atomic games with variance constraints, and characterized it
in terms of single-point-supported deviations. Inequality constraints are always beneficial for the
vulnerable players, and in some cases they could be beneficial for the non-vulnerable players as
well. Furthermore, inequality constraints delay the spread of epidemics and reduce its prevalence.
There are several directions for future research. Some of them involve the use real data to
check the predictions of the model, the modeling of the dynamic response of players and the
study of other applications of the variance constrained games defined.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Proposition 1
Equation (1) can be written as:
x˙1u = −rux1u · (Mx)
x˙2u = −rux2u · (Mx)
x˙3u = rux1u · (Mx)− α1x3u
x˙4u = rux2u · (Mx)− α1x4u
x˙5 =Mx
, (13)
where M ∈ X? with:
Mx =
∫
x3uuµ1(du) +
∫
x4uuµ2(du).
Note that ‖M‖ ≤ n1 + n2. The initial conditions are x1u(0) = x2u(0) = 1 − I0, x3u(0) =
x4u(0) = I0, for all u ∈ [um, uM ] and x5(0) = 0. In compact form we write x˙ = fµ1,µ2(x).
Lemma 3: Any solution of (13) with the given initial conditions satisfies 0 ≤ x1u, . . . , x4u ≤ 1.
Let us denote this set by X0 i.e., X0 = {x ∈ X : 0 ≤ x1u, . . . , x4u ≤ 1, for all u}.
Proof : Consider such a solution. Observe that, x1u(t), x2u(t) ≥ 0 for all u and t. Similarly, since
x ≥ 0 implies Mx ≥ 0 we have x3u(t), x4u(t) ≥ 0 for all t, u. Finally, x˙1u + x˙3u ≤ 0 and thus,
x3u(t) ≤ x1u(0) + x3u(0) = 1. Similarly, x4u(t) ≤ 1. 
Lemma 4: Let x(t) be a solution of (13) with the given initial conditions. Then, xju(t) is
continuous on u, for j = 1, . . . , 4.
Proof : Let h(t) = Mx(t). Then, 0 ≤ h(t) ≤ n1 + n2. The solution of x˙1u = −ruh(t)x1u given
by:
x1u(t) = (1− I0) exp
(
−ru
∫ t
0
h(s)ds
)
depends continuously on u, t. A similar argument shows that x2u is continuous on u, t. Then,
observe that, the third equation of (13) can be written as:
x˙3u = b(u, t)− α1x3u,
where b(u, t) = rux1u ·Mx is continuous on u and bounded by uMr(n1 + n2)(1 − I0). The
solution of this differential equation is:
x3u(t) = x3u(0)e
−α1t +
∫ t
0
eα1(τ−t)b(u, τ)dt,
September 2, 2020 DRAFT
20
which is again continuous on u, t. A similar argument shows that x4u is continuous on u, t. 
We then proceed to the proof of the proposition. Consider a saturated version of (13):
x˙1u = −rusat1(x1u) · sat2(Mx)
x˙2u = −rusat1(x2u) · sat2(Mx)
x˙3u = rusat1(x1u) · sat2(Mx)− α1x3u
x˙4u = rusat1(x2u) · sat2(Mx)− α2x4u
x˙5 =Mx
, (14)
where sat1(z) = max{min{z, 1}, 0} and sat2(z) = max{min{z, n1 + n2}, 0}. Due to Lemma 3,
any solution of (13), with the given initial conditions, is also a solution of the modified system.
Denote this system in compact form as x˙ = f˜(x). It is not difficult to see that f˜ : X → X is
Lipschitz with constant:
L = 2ruM(n1 + n2) + α1 + α2.
Thus, Theorem 7.3 of [41] implies that there exists a unique solution within the space C([0, T ], X)
of continuous functions with values in X . Lemma 4, along with the compactness of [um, uM ]
show that there is no solution of (13) not belonging to C([0, T ], X). 
Remark 9: Note that f˜ is uniformly Lipschitz. The constant is uniform in µ1, µ2, for positive
measures of total mass n1, n2.
B. Proof of Lemma 1
We then proceed to the proof Lemma 1 and the computation of a formula for the directional
derivative of the variance. To this end, we first consider the sensitivity of the solution of (1)
with respect to the deviation εδµj .
We first compute the directional derivative of fµ1,µ2(x) in the direction δµ. The value of
fµ1,µ2(x) depends on µj through the quantity I
f (t). This quantity can be written as:
If (t) = TµjIj·(t) +Tµ−jI−j·(t),
where Ij·(t) : [um, uM ]→ R with u 7→ Iju(t) and Tµ ∈ (C([um, uM ],R))? with:
TµIj·(t) =
∫
Iju′(t)u
′ · µ(du′). (15)
The directional derivative of fµ1,µ2(x) in the direction δµj is:
Dδµj [fµ1,µ2(x)] = [−ruSjuTδµjIj·, −ruS(−j)uTδµjIj·, ruSjuTδµjIj·, ruS(−j)uTδµjIj·, TδµjIj·]T .
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Observe that, due to the form of Tδµj in (15), there is a bounded linear operator Bµ1,µ2(t) :
Y → X such that:
Dδµj [fµ1,µ2(x(t))] =Bµ1,µ2(t)δµj.
The linearized version of (1), around the trajectories (S1u, S2u, I1u, I2u), is given by:
x˙′1u = −(ruIf )x′1u − ruS1u(Tµ1x′3· +Tµ2x′4·)− ruS1uTδµjIj·
x˙′2u = −(ruIf )x′2u − ruS2u(Tµ1x′3· +Tµ2x′4·)− ruS2uTδµjIj·
x˙′3u = (ruI
f )x′1u + ruS1u(Tµ1x
′
3· +Tµ2x
′
4·)− α1x′3u + ruS1uTδµjIj·
x˙′4u = (ruI
f )x′2u + ruS2u(Tµ1x
′
3· +Tµ2x
′
4·)− α2x′4u + ruS2uTδµjIj·
x˙′5 = Tµ1x
′
3u +Tµ2x
′
4u +TδµjIj·
, (16)
where If = Ifµ1,µ2 as in (2). Thus, (16) is a LTV system in the form:
x˙′ = Aµ1,µ2(t)x
′ +Bµ1,µ2(t)δµj. (17)
Lemma 5: Denote by φµ1,µ2(t) the solution of (1). Then, the directional derivatives x′lu =
Dδµjφ
lu
µ1,µ2
(t), for l = 1, . . . , 4 and x′5 = Dδµjφ
5
µ1,µ2
(t) satisfy (17), with zero initial conditions.
Proof: Consider the function: f¯ : Y ×X → X with:
f¯(µ¯, x) = fµ¯,µ−j(x)
and the set D = X0 × {µ ∈ Y : ‖µ‖ = nj}
The function f¯(µ¯, x) is continuously Fre´chet differentiable with respect to x. Its derivative is
the operator Aµ1,µ2(t) given in (16)–(17), which is continuous and bounded in D. The directional
derivative:
Dδµj [f¯(µ¯, x)] =Bµ1,µ2(t)δµj,
is also continuous in x and bounded in D. Furthermore, X0 is positively invariant. Thus, Theorem
1 of [42] applies and the proof is complete. 
Therefore, F is continuous in µj and Jj(u′, µj, µ−j) is continuous in µj , uniformly in u′. This
proves (8).
Lemma 6: There is a continuous function f varj,F,µ1,µ2(u) such that the directional derivative of
F (µ1, µ2) on the δµj direction is given by:
DδµjF (µ1, µ2) = rx
′
5(T ) =
∫
f varj,F,µ1,µ2(u
′)δµj(du′).
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Proof: Observe that Bµ1,µ2(t) : Y → X can be written as a composition of two linear operators
B1µ1,µ2(t) : Y → R and B2µ1,µ2(t) : R→ X with: B1µ1,µ2(δµ) = TδµjIj· and
B2µ1,µ2(l) =
[
−rux1ul −rux2ul rux1ul rux2ul l
]T
.
The solution of the LTV system (17) with zero initial conditions is written in the form ([43]
paragraph 1.4):
x′(T ) =
∫ T
0
Ψ(T, t)Bµ1,µ2(t)δµjdt
where Ψ(t, s) : X → X is the state transition operator.
Denote by C : X → R the operator picking the last component i.e., C(x′) = x′5. Then, x′5(T )
can be written as:
x′5(T ) =
∫ T
0
[CΨ(T, t)B2µ1,µ2(t)]B
1
µ1,µ2
(t)δµjdt.
Note that ψt = CΨ(T, t)B2µ1,µ2 is a linear function ψt : R→ R. Write this function as ψt(l) =
ϕ(t) · l. Thus:
x′5(T ) =
∫ T
0
ϕ(t)
∫
uxj+2,u(t)δµj(du)dt =
∫ [
u
∫ T
0
ϕ(t)xj+2,u(t)dt
]
δµj(du)
Define:
f varj,F,µ1,µ2(u) = ru
∫ T
0
ϕ(t)xj+2,u(t)dt
Observe that, since xj+2,u(t) is continuous with respect to u, the function f varj,F,µ1,µ2(u) is also
continuous in u. Thus:
DδµjF (µ1, µ2) = rx
′
5(T ) =
∫
f varj,F,µ1,µ2(u)δµj(du),
and the proof is complete 
The directional derivative of u¯j is given by:
Dδµj u¯j =
∫
u′δµj(du′)/nj.
The directional derivative of the cost of a player of type j′ who uses an action u is given by:
DδµjJj′(u, µj, µ−j) = Gj′(1− I0)ue−uFDδµjF − sj′juDδµj u¯j
=
∫
f varj,Jj′ ,µ1,µ2(u
′, u)δµj(du′), (18)
where:
f varj,Jj′ ,µ1,µ2(u
′, u) = Gj′(1− I0)ue−uFf varj,F,µ1,µ2(u′)− sj′juu′/nj,
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is a continuous function of u′, u. The directional derivative of the mean cost of the players of
type j (the same with the type of the deviating players) is given by:
Dδµj J¯j = lim
ε→0
[
1
εnj
[∫
Jj(u, µj + εδµj, µ−j)(µj + εδµj)(du)−
∫
Jj(u, µj, µ−j)µj(du)
]]
=
∫
DδµjJj(u, µj, µ−j)µ¯j(du) + lim
ε→0
[
1
nj
∫
Jj(u, µj + εδµj, µ−j)δµj(du)
]
=
∫
DδµjJj(u, µj, µ−j)µ¯j(du) +
1
nj
∫
Jj(u, µj, µ−j)δµj(du).
Substituting (18) into the last equation and using Fubini’s theorem, we get:
Dδµj J¯j =
∫ [
1
nj
Jj(u, µj, µ−j) +
∫
f varJj ,µ1,µ2(u
′, u)µ¯j(du)
]
δµj(du
′)
=
∫
f varj,J¯j ,µ1,µ2(u
′)δµj(du′) (19)
Similarly:
Dδµj J¯−j =
∫ [∫
f varj,J−j ,µ1,µ2(u
′, u)µ¯−j(du)
]
δµj(du
′)
=
∫
f varj,J¯−j ,µ1,µ2(u
′)δµj(du′)
Combining the last two equations we compute the variation of the mean cost:
Dδµj J¯ = (n1Dδµj J¯1 + n2Dδµj J¯2)/(n1 + n2) =
∫
f varj,J¯ ,µ1,µ2(u
′)δµj(du′).
We then proceed to the computation of the directional derivative of the variance in two steps.
The first part is:
Dδµj
[∫
(Jj(u, µj, µ−j)− J¯)2µj(du)
]
=
= lim
ε→0
1
ε
[∫
(Jj(u, µj + εδµj, µ−j)− J¯(µj + εδµj, µ−j))2(µj + εδµj)(du)−
−
∫
(Jj(u, µj, µ−j)− J¯(µj, µ−j))2µj(du)
]
=
∫
(Jj(u, µj, µ−j)− J¯)2δµj(du)+
+ 2
∫
(Jj(u, µj, µ−j)− J¯(µj, µ−j))
∫
[f varj,Jj ,µ1,µ2(u
′, u)− f varj,J¯ ,µ1,µ2(u′)]δµj(du′)µj(du)
=
∫
f varj,Vj ,µ1,µ2(u
′)δµj(du′).
In the second equality the interchange of the integral with the limit is possible, because the
convergence limε→0[Jj(u, µj +εδµj, µ−j)−Jj(u, µj, µ−j)]/ε is uniform in u. In the last equality
we use again Fubini’s theorem. Note that f varj,Vj ,µ1,µ2(u
′) is continuous in u′.
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Similarly:
Dδµj
[∫
(J−j(u, µj, µ−j)− J¯)2µj(du)
]
=
= 2
∫
(J−j(u, µj, µ−j)− J¯(µj, µ−j))
∫
[f varj,J−j ,µ1,µ2(u
′, u)− f varj,J¯ ,µ1,µ2(u′)]δµj(du′)µj(du′)
=
∫
f varj,V−j ,µ1,µ2(u
′)δµj(du′)
Therefore, the directional derivative of the variance is written as:
DδµjV (µj, µ−j) =
∫
f varj,V,µ1,µ2(u
′)δµj(du′),
for a continuous function f varj,V,µ1,µ2(u
′).
C. Proof of Proposition 3
Let us drop the dependence on j. Inequalities (10), recalling that µ¯′ is a probability measure,
can be written as: ∫
f¯K(u
′)µ¯′(du′) < 0,∫
f¯L(u
′)µ¯′(du′) < 0,
where f¯K(u′) = Jj(u′, µ1, µ2)−
∫
Jj(u
′, µ1, µ2)µ¯(du′), f¯L(u′) = f varj,Vj ,µ1,µ2(u
′)−∫ f varj,Vj ,µ1,µ2(u′)µ¯(du′).
Using the (uniform) continuity of f¯K, f¯K we have that for a set of u1, . . . , uN and c1, . . . , cN >
0 it holds:
c1f¯K(u1) + · · ·+ cN f¯K(uN) < 0,
c1f¯L(u1) + · · ·+ cN f¯L(uN) < 0,
If there is a point uk where f¯K(uk) < 0 and f¯L(uk) ≤ 0 or f¯K(uk) ≤ 0 and f¯L(uk) < 0 we
are done. Thus, assume that there is no such point. Excluding from the summation the terms
where both f¯K(uk) and f¯L(uk) are non-negative the inequalities still hold true. Thus, assume
that for any point uk either f¯K(uk) < 0 < f¯L(uk) or f¯L(uk) < 0 < f¯K(uk). Reordering the
terms, the inequalities can be written as:
x1 + · · ·+ xn − y1 − · · · − ym < 0
−z1 − · · · − zn + w1 + · · ·+ wm < 0
(20)
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where
xi = cki f¯K(uki), ki ∈ {k : ckf¯K(uk) > 0},
yi = |cki f¯K(uki)|, ki ∈ {k : ckf¯K(uk) < 0},
wi = cki f¯L(uki), ki ∈ {k : ckf¯L(uk) > 0},
zi = |cki f¯L(uki)|, ki ∈ {k : ckf¯L(uk) < 0}.
Let i0 be such that yi0/wi0 ≥ yi/wi for all i and denote α = yi0/wi0 .
Claim 1: There is a j0 such that αzj0 > xj0 . Indeed if this in not true, and αzj ≤ xj for all j,
then multiplying the second relationship with α we get:
−αz1 − · · · − αzn + αw1 + · · ·+ αwm ≥ −x1 − · · · − xn + y1 + · · ·+ ym > 0.
This completes the proof of the claim.
Claim 2: We may choose a ρ ∈ [0, 1] such that:
ρxj0 − (1− ρ)yi0 < 0
−ρzj0 + (1− ρ)wi0 < 0
Indeed for ρ in the interval:
yi0
αzj0 + yi0
< ρ <
yi0
xj0 + yi0
,
both inequalities are valid. The interval is not empty, since αzj0 > xj0 .
Choose such a ρ. Then, using the form of x, y, z, w, there are k1, k2 such that:
ρck1 f¯K(uk1) + (1− ρ)ck2 f¯K(uk2) < 0,
ρck1 f¯L(uk1) + (1− ρ)ck2 f¯K(uk2) < 0,
Thus, taking
µ¯′′ =
ρck1
ρck1 + (1− ρ)ck2
duk1 +
(1− ρ)ck2
ρck1 + (1− ρ)ck2
duk2 ,
where du is the Dirac measure at u, and the proof is complete.
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D. Computation of GNE
Consider a discrete set Ud ⊂ [um, uM ] and a grid Ud × Ud of pairs (u1, u2). We first find
the set of pairs (u1, u2) on the grid, such that V (n1du1 , n2du2) = C approximately holds. The
dynamics becomes:
S˙1u1 = −ru1IfS1u1 , S˙2u2 = −ru2IfS2u2 ,
I˙1u1 = ru1I
fS1u1 − α1I1u1 , I˙2u2 = ru2IfS2u2 − α2I2u2
z˙ = If ,
, (21)
where If (t) = u1n1I1u1(t) + u2n2I2u2(t).
For every point on the grid that V (n1du1 , n2du2) = C approximately holds, we compute the
function gKj,µ1,µ2(u), for u ∈ U , as:
gKj,µ1,µ2(u) = Jj(u,du1 ,du2)− Jj(uj,du1 ,du2).
For j = 1, 2 and a grid of values of u ∈ U , we solve the pair of differential equations:
S˙1u = −ruIfS1u, I˙1u = ruIfS1u − αjI1u
where If is the quantity computed during the solution of (21).
Consider the variation δµj = du − duj The linearized system around the solution of (21)
consists of 5 differential equations:
x˙′1u1 = −(ru1If )x′1u1 − ru1S1u1(n1u1x′3u1 + n2u2x′4u2)− ru1S1u1(Iju − Ijuj)
x˙′2u2 = −(ruIf )x′2u2 − ru2S2u2(n1u1x′3u1 + n2u2x′4u2)− ru2S2u2(Iju − Ijuj)
x˙′3u1 = (ru1I
f )x′1u1 + ru1S1u1(n1u1x
′
3u1
+ n2u2x
′
4u2
)− α1x′3u1 + ru1S1u1(Iju − Ijuj)
x˙′4u2 = (ru2I
f )x′2u2 + ru2S2u2(n1u1x
′
3u1
+ n2u2x
′
4u2
)− α2x′4u2 + ru2S2u2(Iju − Ijuj)
x˙′5 = n1u1x
′
3u1
+ n2u2x
′
4u2
+ Iju − Ijuj
,
with zero initial conditions. It holds DδµjF (µ1, µ2) = x
′
5(T ), and Dδµj u¯j = (u − uj)/nj. The
directional derivative DδµjJj′(u, µj, µ−j) is given in (18) and the directional derivative Dδµj J¯j
by:
Dδµj J¯j = DδµjJj(uj, µj, µ−j) +
1
nj
(Jj(u, µj, µ−j)− Jj(uj, µj, µ−j)).
Furthermore Dδµj J¯−j = DδµjJ−j(u−j, µj, µ−j) and Dδµj J¯ = (n1Dδµj J¯1 +n2Dδµj J¯2)/(n1 +n2).
The directional derivative of the variance can be written as:
DδµjV = (DδµjV1 +DδµjV2)/(n1 + n2),
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where
DδµjV1 = Dδµj
[∫
(Jj(u
′, µj, µ−j)− J¯)2µj(du′)
]
=
= (Jj(u, µj, µ−j)− J¯)2 − (Jj(uj, µj, µ−j)− J¯)2+
+ 2nj(Jj(uj, µj, µ−j)− J¯(µj, µ−j))
[
DδµjJj(uj, µj, µ−j)−Dδµj J¯
]
,
and:
DδµjV2 = Dδµj
[∫
(J−j(u′, µj, µ−j)− J¯)2µ−j(du′)
]
=
= 2n−j(J−j(u−j, µj, µ−j)− J¯(µj, µ−j))
[
DδµjJ−j(u−j, µj, µ−j)−Dδµj J¯
]
We then compute the values of gLj,µ1,µ2(u), for u ∈ U and use Corollary 4 to check if u1, u2
is a GNE.
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